« Partnerships», « migration compacts » … the new dress up of the externalisation of the European migration policy

This post is also available in: frFrançais (French)

 22 December 2016 – In June 2016, the European Council adopted the new Partnership Framework with third countries in the field of migration management, which was proposed by the Commission. The AEDH, as other associations, had strongly criticized it, both for its objectives and for the way it intended to mobilise all the resources for “external actions”, even including development aid, in order “to address the root causes of irregular migration”[1]. In its communication on the 7th of June, The Commission specified that those agreements would allow giving a new impetus to the politics of reinstallation, but would also improve the reception capacities of third countries with the aim of implementing the return operations. We could find in it the same intention that presided over the organisation of the EU-Africa Valetta Summit in November 2015, but whose conclusions had been less promising than expected (by and for the EU, obviously!).

Since June, the Commission passed to action and committed itself in the negotiation of new partnerships – called “compacts” – with countries precisely targeted as countries of origin or transit of migration, or even host countries facing an acute pressure. In a rather logical way, it’s in the framework of the ENP that the EU has chosen same “partners”, but it also expanded its scope to certain African countries present at the Valetta Summit.

By this approach 13 countries are targeted and taken into account one after the other (Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Egypt and Libya), to which two regions have to be added: West Africa and the Horn of Africa, and, of course, the historical European partners (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria). Within this list, the Commission considers as priorities five African countries (Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Senegal) in response to the evolution of migratory routes and to the fact that arrivals by the Mediterranean had never diminished in 2016.

According to the first report published by the Commission (18 October 2016), the term “compact” refers to a “new political framework” of EU relations with third countries “for continued and operational cooperation, pulling together the different work strands in order to develop a comprehensive partnership […], combining the instruments, tools and leverages available to the EU and Member States to deliver clear targets and joint commitments”. The Commission does not forget to underline that “formal international agreements, such as readmission agreements, can flow from the compact process. But the compacts approach avoids the risk that concrete delivery is held up by technical negotiations for a fully-fledged formal agreement”. In this way the Commission accomplishes that the European Parliament will not be able to interfere with the content of the so negotiated agreements.

A second progress report published by the Commission on the 14th of December, witnesses the “intense rhythm” of initiatives, discussions, proposals, since October, with the help of Ministers of Member States, European Commissioners and the High Representative; not less than twenty visits have taken place to the targeted countries.

But, apparently, the results are less tangible than was hoped for by the Commission and wished by the European Council. We can observe a reduction on the transit flow within Africa and 2 700 migrants have been returned to the so called priority countries in 2016, but, the Commission recognises, this “has not yet resulted in reduced arrivals to Europe. Arrivals from the five priority countries via the Central Mediterranean route in 2016 have increased to almost 59 000, out of a total of over 173 000 arrivals via this route”. The Commission intends to go on and extend the implementation of the partnership framework and – diplomatically calls on Member States to commit to the same direction.

Considering these perspectives, it seemed to us useful to present, in this newsletter, a synthetic analysis of this cooperation to which third countries are ardently called out. The different forms of partnership are then listed below, with their means, their objectives and their actors. No doubt  the year 2017 will lead us to come back to this issue and to its repercussions on the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.


v LEBANON : the first signed compact

The interest for Lebanon, as for Jordan, is due to the fact that this country hosts a high number of people fleeting the conflicts in Syria. With the arrival of 1.5 million Syrians on 4.5 million habitants, Lebanon is in a dire economic situation and the EU committed to support its efforts by providing aid at a height of 666 million euros.

Since 2006, the EU and Lebanon are bound by an association agreement and, in the framework of the ENP, discussions began in 2014 with the objective to come to a mobility partnership. It’s then within the logic of historical relations that the partnership priorities and the compact were adopted on the 15th of November 2016[2]. The compact establishes a financial aid of 480 million euros for 2016 and 2017, in order to provide basic services and to improve the economic opportunities, the legal status and the living conditions of refugees and vulnerable host communities.

Nevertheless, the management of refugees is left de jure and de facto to Lebanon which, as civil society organisations have denounced, already raises problems. According to Human Rights Watch, in a memorandum published the 30th of November, an “integrated border management” could lead to forced returns to Syria, to entry refusals for asylum seekers and to restrictions of the rights for Syrian refugees. This pessimistic analysis is confirmed by the report published the 31st of October by the Lebanese Center for Human Rights, which shows how the politics of the Lebanese government negatively affect the life of Syrian refugees, obliged to live in conditions deprived of personal, economic and legal security[4].


v At the heart of the compacts, the readmission of migrants

Ø  Jordan. Since 2002, EU and Jordan are bound by an association agreement and a mobility partnership was signed on the 1st of October 2014. The signature of a compact with Jordan was reached in return for a simplification of the rules of origin  for Jordanian products exported to the EU, agreed in July 2016,[5] and, moreover, on the 6th of December the Council decided to provide a macro-financial assistance of 200 million euros[6] to this country. From Jordan, it is expected to open the access to job opportunities and to education for Syrian refugees[7]. On the 20th of December, the respective Association Councils formally adopted the partnership priorities and the compact[8]. As agreed by the two parties, discussions on a readmission agreement will start ”for orderly management of migration flows[9].

Ø Nigeria. In March 2005 a « common agenda for Mobility and Migration » (CAMM) was signed between Nigeria and the EU, forming the basis of the dialogue and cooperation in the field of migration. The new partnership framework with this country is based on the fact that Nigeria is an important country of origin of “irregular” immigration and the traffic of human beings. The negotiations for the conclusion of a readmission agreement have been accelerated, with the formal adoption of a mandate for negotiations by the Council, in September 2016, and their launch on the 26th of October 2016[10]. In its last report, the Commission congratulates itself for the improvement of the effective return rate, thanks to the delivery by Nigeria of “emergency travel documents” requested by Member States, to the collaboration with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and to more efficient work for the identification of migrants to return. To this, we must add a strengthening of the fight against smugglers, through a common platform launched in October. Finally, the EU foresees not only to support the political stability of the country facing the crisis caused by Boko Haram, but also the implementation of projects for the reintegration of migrants and for the anti-radicalisation.

Ø Afghanistan. The approach of the new global partnership framework with third countries was at the basis of the signature, on 2 October, of the declaration « Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU ». The agreement, concluded without any debate within the European Parliament, establishes the readmission of Afghans towards their country of origin. Under the coordination of Frontex, flights to Kabul or other Afghan airports will be planned, allowing the return of “irregular” Afghans present in Europe. The relations between the two partners have been straightened following their meeting in Brussels, the 4th and 5th October (the signature of a contract for 200 million euros, aimed to support reforms in Afghanistan, being concluded[12]) and after the first reunion of the Joint Working Group, on 30 November of this year. In its last report of December 14, the Commission claimed its will to promote a regional approach to support and reintegrate all Afghans displaced in their region of origin, in cooperation with the UNHCR.

Ø Pakistan. The cooperation with Pakistan has been increased with the conclusion, in 2010, of a readmission agreement[13], the returns and the reintegration of migrants being within the EU priorities[14]. However, the difficulties in the implementation of this agreement have required the intervention, on several occasions, of a Joint Readmission Committee, in order to improve the verification procedures, and thus the returns[15]. In November 2015, the Pakistani Minister of Interior thus suspended this agreement, considering that the return of Pakistanis took place without any proper verification of their identity[16]. An electronic platform would for sure improve the procedures. Furthermore, in the framework of a global partnership, the EU foresees to strengthen the cooperation in the fight of smuggling.

v  A strengthen cooperation as regards to return

Since the entry into function of the Junker Commission, in November 2014, the objective of a greater efficiency of the policy of returns is omnipresent on the European agenda. Initially perceived as the condition of “the credibility of the European Union policy related to legal migration and asylum”, it soon took the dimension of an intrinsic instrument for the management of the “crisis” engendered by the inflow of arrivals at external borders. The return from the European territory of those migrants unwilling to apply for international protection is from now on presented as the condition of the reception of “refugees”.

For several years, the Commission highlighted that the problem, in this field, comes from the weak effective return rate (less than 40% as stated at the time of the publication, in 2014, of the first report on the implementation of the “return directive”[17]).The observation, according to which, within the reasons of this relative failure, there is a certain “lack of cooperation from the non-EU country of origin or transit” due to “problems in obtaining the necessary documentation from consular authorities”, has created, for several years, the will to “further develop the cooperation with non-EU countries”[18]. Recent bilateral or multilateral initiatives, (La Valletta Summit, Khartoum Process, Rabat Process, “compacts”, Mobility Partnership, etc.) are part of the continuity of the European policy in the “concrete” management of migration flows… From the EU side, the recent regulation on the “European laisse passer” is aimed to improve the logistic efficiency of returns, bypassing the annoying consular procedure.

Ø Mali. Country of origin and transit, its role is considered as fundamental in the prevention of “irregular” migration coming from the Sahel region. Bilateral relation established between Mali and Member States have led to the implementation of “standard operating procedures” for the cooperation between consulates, in order to speed up migrants’ identification and organise their return. Moreover, Mali benefits from six projects financed by the Trust Fund for Africa, aimed to contribute to the facilitation of return operations, to the reintegration of “irregular” migrants and to the creation of economic opportunities in the country. New projects are to be finalised, in particular, for the biometric recording of the population and for awareness campaigns on risk of “irregular” migration! Furthermore, “anti-smuggling” activities are contemplated by the EU.

At the occasion of a visit in Bamako of an Italian delegation and an EU mission, on the 10th of November 2016, focused on migration issues, Mali civil society expressed its strong opposition to European projects. The Association malienne des expulsés (AME), the Conseil supérieur de la diaspora malienne (CSDM) and Amnesty International-Mali have so denounced the European laissez-passer and the signing of a readmission agreement, which would allow the expulsion of undocumented immigrants to their country of origin. For these organisations, the European laissez-passer is an infringement of norms ruling consular relations (Vienna Convention of 20 April 1963) and they recalled that, at the time of the Valletta Summit in November 2015, the African heads of State rejected in block this issue, considering it falls within the national sovereignty of each countryNotwithstanding these reservations – that we can find on the side of European civil society too -, last 11th of December, the EU and Mali signed a political commitment presented as a « communiqué commun ». The priorities settled by the two partners are: job creation for young people; strengthening of the civil registration system; delivery of identity cards and secure passports and use of biometric passports; management of borders and better control of the territory; protection of migrants in transit to Mali and fight against human trafficking and smugglers; support to returns from Europe of people in an irregular situation[22].


Ø Senegal. This country is at the origin of an important immigration within the EU and the returns are, on the other hand, weak. The “dialogue” with Senegal is thus focused on the prevention of “irregular” migration and on the improvement of job opportunities in the country. Following a visit of the Commissioner Avramopoulos in July, Member States plan the negotiation of bilateral agreement on return and readmission. An operational cooperation with the European agency of border and coast guard sill support the efforts wished in the identification of Senegalese migrants and in the delivery of travel documents. Furthermore, the EU decided on the 25th of October, to finance two projects (60 million euros), to “develop economies and businesses in departure zones of migrants and improve living conditions in rural areas[23].


Ø Ethiopia. It’s a strategic partnership for the EU, being Ethiopia a country of origin and transit of « irregular » migration to Europe, but also for its role within the Khartoum Process. Two declarations between the EU and Ethiopia form the keystone of the dialogue on migration issues: the Common agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM), signed in November 2015, and the joint declaration “Towards an EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement”, adopted the 14 July 2016In April 2016, the EU approved a “second package of measures approved to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement in the Horn of Africa”, amounting to 117 million euros, funded by the Emergency EU Trust Fund for Africa. On this pact, Ethiopia received 30 million euros in order to improve the living conditions of Eritrean and Somali refugees and to support their host communities[25]The EU intends, moreover, to strengthen the collaboration with Ethiopia as regards to returns, at present judged as insufficient (172 since January 2016).


Ø Bangladesh. For the European Union, it’s an important partner concerning return. The EU wished the signature of standard operating procedure in order to facilitate them, identification missions, information campaigns and reintegration projects. But it seems that the “partner” is somewhat reluctant. In fact, in January 2016, the minister of Interior of Bangladesh, Mr. Shahidul Haque, deeply contested the perspective of a readmission agreement with the EU, arguing the fact that Pakistan suspended the one signed in 2011, Sri Lanka never implemented its one (2004) and its country is only an “observer” in the framework of the Budapest Process[27].


Ø Libya. The consequences of the civil war in Libya are of first importance for the EU, the internal conflict having produced more than 400,000 internal displaced and more than 230,000 foreign nationals present in the Libyan soil. The return to the political stability and the security of the country is then essential for the EU. Especially as Libya plays a key role in the migratory route of Central Mediterranean, crucial departure or transit point for people willing to reach the European coasts. It is in this context and in order to reduce the traffic by smugglers, that the EU launched the EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia, and that the Italian authorities are collaborating to the creation of a Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre. In August 2016, an EU-Libyan Committee was set up for an integrated management of external borders. In this context projects for a value of 100 million euros are aimed at the assistance of vulnerable migrants and internally displaced, at the stabilisation and the fight against smugglers. The support from IOM would allow, meanwhile, to develop a voluntary return policy for migrants at the moment stranded in Libya. Apparently, European authorities do not look troubled by the paradox created by their will to operate “repatriation and reintegration”, while observing the dire conditions of migrants in Libya.


v « Partners » for a better management of migration flows

Ø Niger. It is the main country of transit for migrants coming from Central and Western Africa; but it is also a country hosting a great number of Nigerian and Malian refugees and internal displaced fleeting Boko Haram massacres. “In spite of this, Niger has maintained a strong engagement with the EU in particular to counter migrant smuggling and to reduce the flow of irregular migrants becoming a showcase of how the EU and its Member States can combine the various instruments and tools available in a comprehensive manner”, the Commission congratulates itself[29]

Within this particular context, EU relations with this country have been led with the collaboration of the HCR, which ensures the protection of more than 200,000 people only in the region of Diffa. But their relations involve also the cracking down on smugglers and traffickers of human beings, as well as on the development of growth and jobThe strengthened cooperation with this country has been translated in the creation, at Agadez, of a local coordination platform on migration (“Cadre de Concertation”), co-chaired by the Nigerian Minister of Interior and the Head of the EU delegation in the country. The EU support to the country is effected also through the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission, which contributes to the training of security forces (intelligence techniques, arrests) and procedures, and to the support at the national fight against smuggling and to the surveillance of external borders. The EU provides, in the same way, financial aid for the reintegration of migrants in the country and the development of the local economy. In its last report, the Commission is pleased with this cooperation, that is judged being exemplary of the nature of the relations established between the two partners and for the progress made in tackling “irregular” migration within and from this region: reduction of the number of people leaving this country to cross the Sahara and of migrants transiting through Niger, increase of the “voluntary repatriation” organised by the IOM and fight against smugglers.

Ø Iran. The collaboration with Iran in the management of migration flows judged as fundamental o reason of the geostrategic position of the country in the migratory routes coming from Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the EU intends to support the efforts of the country in the reception and integration of an increasing number of Afghans and, in this regard, has provided a humanitarian aid of 12.5 million euros for Afghans refugees (on the 24 October another additional humanitarian assistance was approved worth 6 million euros)[30].

Ø Egypt. An association agreement with Egypt, in force since 2004, shapes the relations between the EU and Egypt. In addition to the financial support for the socio-economic development (increased by the financial aid of 129 million euros, agreed in October) and the protection of vulnerable groups, the EU considers the country as a key partner in the cracking down on smugglers and in the management of the migration flows on the Central Mediterranean route. Yet, until now this country has refused to sign a “mobility partnership” (see below). No doubt that the issue was on the agenda during Commissioner Avramopoulos’ visit to President Abdel Fatah Al Sisi, on the 14th of November. In fact, Egypt has just signed a new law against clandestine migration (law n°82 2016), establishing a common ground for further dialogue with the EU.[32]

v Mobility Partnership … still waiting

In 2007 appeared in the European terminology the concept “Mobility Partnership » (MP).[33] It is difficult to give a clear definition in this article, the communication of the European Commission being itself quite confused: “it is impossible to list all the possible components of a mobility partnership here, as these will depend on the specific situation”. However, we need to keep in mind that these agreements are not binding. Concerning their content, negotiated country-by-country, it mostly consists in a visa facilitation agreement in exchange of the signature of a readmission agreement with the EU.

To the image of agreements of this nature concluded with Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia and Azerbaijan, in 2011 the EU committed in the negotiation of MP with its euro-Mediterranean partners. Morocco (on the 07.06.2013), Tunisia (on the 09.10.2014) signed; Egypt, up to now, refused.

Ø Tunisia. The EU support to Tunisian democratic transition has taken political, financial and technical forms. Without surprise, taking into account the geographic situation of this country and the links between Tunisians and Member States from the South, the migration issue slid within the negotiation table.

Strengthened after the MP was signed in March 2014, the EU insists on the implementation of a more active cooperation on returns and readmissions[34]. In compensation, as in all negotiations of this nature, the EU declares to commit to visa facilitation.

Negotiations thus started on the 12th of October 2016. The fact that readmission would concern, apart from Tunisian nationals, migrants having transited trough the territory of this country poses a fundamental problem that civil society organisations did not lack to denounce, guarantees of rights not being ensured for people in an irregular situation and the nonexistent legislation on asylum, for the time being. Reservations concerning the Commission’s proposals are the more marked in the case of visa liberalisation, limited to some categories of people, and it fails to answer to the major aspirations of Tunisian citizens. Nothing says that the dialogue between the two partners has been structured in more satisfactory directions for Tunisia, during the visit of the President Beji Caid Essebsi to the European institutions, on 1 December[37], as the last report of the Commission makes no mentioning of it.


Ø Algeria. Algeria and the EU concluded an association agreement in 2005. Since 2002, negotiations started on the signature of a readmission agreement[38]; without any success so far …Despite the EU’s will to strengthen cooperation with this country as regards to migration management, the issue seems to at a “deadlock”, to the point that this country is not even mentioned in the Commission report of 14 December.


Ø Morocco. An association agreement has entered into force with this country since 2000, and a mobility partnership since June 203. In the dynamic of this MP, the EU has called again on the negotiation of a readmission agreement proposed since 2003, again by means of visa facilitation for Marroquin citizens. Up to now, Morocco refused to readmit migrants coming from third countries and having passed through its territory[39].

No project regarding a possible “compact” is then evoked in the reports of the Commission.


Historically, it is at the Tampere European Council (1999), supported by the one in Seville (2002), that the basis for an inclusion of asylum and immigration issues into “the external dimension of community action” were laid down. The aim was clearly stated: to develop an “integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the root causes of illegal immigration” and ensure that “partnership  with  third  countries  would  be  a key  element  for  the  success  of such  a  policy. Since then, the objective has barely changed but its implementations have largely diversified.

The “new partnership” with third countries which is greatly cherished by the European Commission and the European Council, has led to the creation of a new term: “compact”. But, behind this terminological design, AEDH notes that we find the same aims, the same methods, the same contents that the ones covered by the concept of the externalisation of European policies.

Either in the form of a “compact”, a “mobility partnership” or an agreement on “concerted management of migratory flows”, what the EU expects from the third countries is, on one hand, that they ensure an upstream control of the European borders, and, on the other hand, that they “drain” the origin and the transit of “illegal” immigration.

The compensatory measures offered to the “partners” are of two kinds: visa liberalisation and financial supports. The first one is miserably poor and we consider that it cannot contribute to limit the temptations and attempts of illegal immigration; the second one, with millions or even billions of euros, is becoming increasingly important; the EU would buy by this way its protection from migrants.

Our organisation contests and will continue to contest this externalisation of the management of migration flows to countries which are not bound by international conventions or the ECHR, to the same legal standards as EU Member States! Returning migrants to a country that refuses to assure them the right to leave it without permission (Tunisia, Morocco for example), returning them to countries where migrants have no rights or are even mistreated (Libya), where there is no asylum system providing them international protection (almost all partners involved), towards countries where the political situation is that their citizens have to flee their homes so filling “displaced persons” reception centres (Nigeria, Niger, Afghanistan,…), is a shameful way to discharge the burden and to shrug off its responsibility.

It is true that, in a (praiseworthy) impetus, the Council, in parallel, advocates the opening of legal migration channels for the reception of refugees. But the objective to host 22,504 people – less than 4 people per million of European citizens – in the framework of the resettlement programme is still not achieved (11 852 in November). So the burden of ensuring protection of the vast majority of world’s refugees is still on third countries…


o   See: Proposal from the European Commission to establish a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 7th of June 2016

o   See: First Progress Report from the European Commission on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 18th of October 2016

See: Second Progress Report from the European Commission on: First Deliverables on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, 14th of December 2016

[1] Read the article of AEDH, « The obsession with migration. Or how the Commission wants to create new “partnership frameworks” with third countries, by using all European policies to “protect” the EU from migrants.”, 27 June 2016,

and the Joint NGO statement ahead of the European Council of 28-29 June 2016 : NGOs strongly condemn new EU policies to contain migration, 26 June 2016,

[2] Council of the EU, « EU and Lebanon adopt partnership priorities and compact”, 15 November 2016,

[3] Human Rights Watch , “Submission on the Lebanon-EU Partnership Priorities and the EU-Lebanon Compact”, 30 November 2016,

[4] Lebanese Center for Human Rights, “Legal challenges faced by refugees from Syria in Lebanon 2016”, 31 October 2016,

[5] European Commission, « EU-Jordan: towards a stronger partnership”, 20 July 2016,

[7] Council of the EU, “Syrian crisis: EU ready to step up on partnerships with Lebanon and Jordan”, 17 October 2016,

[8] Council of the EU, “EU and Jordan adopted partnership priorities and compact”, 20 December 2016,

Council of the EU “Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council decision […”>9][10] European Commission, « The EU and Nigeria start negotiations on readmission”, 26 October 2016,

[11] « Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU », 2 October 2016,

[12] European Commission, « Brussels Conference on Afghanistan: the European Union announces financial assistance to support reforms in Afghanistan”, 4 October 2016,

[13] Council of the EU, “Council Decision 2010/649/EU of 7 October 2010 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation”

[14] Read AEDH position : The Agreement between the European Community and Pakistan on readmission raises significant questions concerning the respect of human rights,-  Press release on 26 April 2010 –

[15] Dunya News report, “Pakistan, EU reach consensus on deportation of migrants, 31 March 2016,

[16] Dawn, « Pakistan suspends readmission agreements with western countries”, 6 novembre 2015,

[17] The figures published by Frontex’s last reports are higher (50 to 60%), being the statistic basis probably different.

[18] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on EU Return Policy, Brussels 28 March 2014 – COM(2014) 199 final –

[19] Délégation de l’Union européenne en République du Mali, « Visite à Bamako d’une délégation italienne et d’une mission de l’UE », 11 novembre 2016,–bamako-dune-dlgation-italienne-et-dune-mission-de-lue_fr

[20] Mali express, « Accord de réadmission : Le Csdm et l’AME se mobilisent contre le ‘’diktat’’ de l’UE », 15 November 2016,

[21] Notre nation, « Accord de réadmission entre le Mali et l’Union européenne : Le non de la société civile malienne », 10 November 2016,

[22] Communiqué commun EU – Mali, 11 décembre 2016.

[23] European Commission, « EU announces new support to tackle root causes of migration in Senegal», 25 October 2016,

[24] Ethiopian embassy, “Press Release: Ethiopia & EU Sign Strategic Engagement Agreement”, 15 juin 2016,

[25] European Commission, “Second package of measures approved to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement in the Horn of Africa”, 28 April 2016,

[26] Dhaka Tribune, « Bangladesh opposes readmission pact with European Union”, 5 janvier, 2016,

[27] Started in 1991 under the shape of a consultative forum, the Budapest Process gathers more than fifty governments, included those of the Western Balkans countries, Eastern partnership, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, Pakistan and Turkey, to which around ten international organisations lust be added. In 2013, it gave burn to the “silk routes partnership for migration”.

[28] Voir: « Niger : La situation humanitaire s’aggrave dans la région de Diffa à cause des attaques de Boko Haram, selon le HCR » ; Centre d’actualités de l’ONU, 24 mai 2016 –

[29] Report of 14 December 2016, p. 3

[30] European Commission, «Commissioner Christos Stylianides visits Iran to discuss humanitarian challenges in the country and in the wider Middle East”, 24 October  2016,  

[31] European Commission, “Commissioner Avramopoulos in Egypt”, 14 November 2016,

[32] Elbalad, “Sisi urges adopting plans to reduce illegal immigration”, 15 novembre 2015,

European Commission, 2007, “Communication from the Commission […”>33][34] European Commission, “Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Strengthening EU support for Tunisia”, 29 September 2016,

[35] European Commission, “The EU and Tunisia start negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission”, 12 October 2016,

[36] Le courrier de l’Atlas, « Tunisie. Opération de déportation illégale en cours, selon des ONG locales », 30 novembre 2016,

[37] European Council, «Press release by Presidents Donald Tusk, Jean-Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz, and President of Tunisia Beji Caid Essebsi”, 1 December 2016,  

[38] European Parliament (study), JP Cassarino, « Readmission Policy in the European Union », 2010,

[39] Huffington Post, « Accord de réadmission avec l’Union européenne: Les enjeux d’une éventuelle conclusion pour le Maroc », 25 février 2015,

[40] European Commission, 2002 Ibidem, p.42


Compte AEDH